Modern Moral Philosophy

Preface
Preface to Second Edition

Moral Discourse and Moral Philosophy
- An Example of Moral Discourse
- Is There a Connection between Moral Philosophy and First-Order Moral Discourse?
Moral Discourse and Theories of Meaning
1. The Referential Theory
  - Simplest Form of the Theory
  - A More Sophisticated Version of the Theory
  - Wittgenstein’s “Picture Theory”
  - The Referential Theory and Moral Discourse
2. The Verificationist Theory
  - Logical Positivism
  - The Verification Principle and Moral Discourse
3. The Causal, or Psychological, Theory
  - Two Senses of Meaning
  - The Psychological Theory and Moral Discourse
4. Meaning as Use
  - The Later Wittgenstein and the Need to Look at the Use to Which Language Is Put
  - Depth Grammar, Forms of Life, and Moral Discourse
  - J. L. Austin and What We Do With Words
  - Meaning, Illocutionary Force, and Moral Discourse
The Intuitionist Theory
1. Moore, and the Rejection of Ethical Naturalism
  - Good as Indefinable
  - The Naturalistic Fallacy
  - Moore’s Predecessors
  - Did Mill Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?
  - Are Moore’s Arguments Good Ones?
  - Is Ethical Naturalism Defensible?
2. The Intuitionism of Prichard and Ross
  - H. A. Prichard
  - W. D. Ross
  - A Predecessor of Prichard and Ross
3. The Claim to Know By Moral Intuition
The Emotivist Theory
1. The Rejection of Nonnaturalism
  - Wittgenstein and the Logical Positivists
  - The Dynamic Character of Moral Discourse
2. Stevenson’s Account of Emotivism
  - Origins of Emotivism
  - Stevenson’s Three Features of Moral Discourse
  - Disagreement in Attitude and Belief
  - The Meaning of Moral Judgments
  - Stevenson’s Patterns of Analysis and the Methodology of Moral Argument
3. Criticism of Emotivism
  - Moral Effects of Emotivism
  - Two Confusions
  - Is Stevenson’s Self-Consistent?
  - Stevenson’s Psychological Theory of Meaning
  - Meaning and Suggestion
  - Truth and Falsity
  - Validity and Invalidity
  - Does Stevenson’s Theory Fit the Facts?
Prescriptivism
1. The Rejection of Emotivism
  - Reasons and Causes
  - Meaning and Perlocutionary Force
2. Hare’s Account of Prescriptivism
  1. Prescriptivity
    - Supervenience
    - Value-Judgments and Imperatives
  2. Universalizability
    - How and Why Are Value Judgments Universalizable?
    - What Makes a Value Judgment Moral?
  3. Logical Relations
3. Criticism
  1. Criticism: Prescriptivity
    - Is Prescriptivism Plausible?
    - How Far Does Hare’s Prescriptivism Go beyond Emotivism?
  2. Criticism: Universalizability
    - Some Misunderstandings
    - Situation Ethics
    - Act- and Rule-Utilitarianism
    - MacIntyre’s Criticism
    - Is the Universalizability Thesis True but Trivial?
    - The Universalizability Thesis and Utilitarianism
    - Is the Universalizability Thesis a Moral Principle?
  3. Criticism: Logical Relations
    - Neustics and Phrastics
    - Hare’s Rules
    - Value-Words and Speech-Acts
    - Kind and Levels of Meaning
The Derivation of “Ought” from “Is”
1. Hume on “Is” and “Ought”
  - New Interpretation No. 1
  - New Interpretation No. 2
  - Which Interpretation is Correct?
2. Contemporary Attempts to Deduce “Ought” from “Is”
  1. Searle’s Derivation of “Ought” from “Is”
    - Criticism of Searle
    - Is Searle Successful?
  2. Gewirth’s Derivation of “Ought” from “Is”
    - Gewirth’s Reason and Method
    - Gewirth’s Derivation
    - Criticisms of Gewirth
Some Further Forms of Descriptivism
1. Two Assumptions of Prescriptivism Rejected
  - Description and Evaluation
  - Criteria and Choice
2. Morality Grounded in Human Wants
  1. “Ought” Taken to Mean “Wants”
  2. “Wants” as Providing a Conclusive Reason for “Ought”
    - Mrs. Foot’s Earlier View
    - Criticism of Mrs. Foot’s Earlier View
    - Mrs. Foot’s Later Views
    - Comparison of Morality and Etiquette
    - Criticism of Mrs. Foot’s Later Views
3. Morality Grounded in Man’s Telos
  1. P. T. Geach on the Meaning of “A Good Man”
    - “Good” as an Attributive Adjective
    - “Man” as a Functional Noun
    - Criticism of Geach
  2. Stuart Hampshire on the Connection Between Attributive and Predicative Uses of “Good”
    - The Nature of the Connection
    - How the Uses are Connected in Aristotle
    - The Difficulties Hampshire finds in Aristotle’s Ethics
  3. A. C. Macintyre on “Man” as a Functional Noun
    - Aristotelian Analysis of Morality
    - Fact and Value
    - The Communal Nature of the Telos
    - Critical Comment
  4. Basil Mitchell on the Connection Between Morality and Religion
  5. Concluding Comment
4. Morality Grounded in Tradition
  - Agreement in Judgments
  - Tradition and Innovation
  - Public Norms
Anti-Utilitarianism and the “Two-Level” Theory
1. Neo-Intuitionism’s Attack on Utilitarianism
  - Three Examples of Neo-Intuitionism
  - Two Lines of Criticism
  - Is Utilitarianism Self-Defeating?
  - Defence of Utilitarianism
2. Hare’s Recent Moral Philosophy
  1. The Constraint of “Logic and the Facts”
    - Fanaticism and Utilitarianism
    - Summary So Far
    - Linguistic and Moral Intuitions
    - Criticisms of Hare on “Logic and the Facts”
  2. The “Two-Level” Theory
    - The Relationship between the “Two Levels” of Moral Thinking
    - Freedom and Reason

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Modern Moral Philosophy 30842

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